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MR. LUNARDI: Hi, everybody. My name is Jason Lunardi.
I’m the Managing Editor of the Fordham Intellectual Property,
Media & Entertainment Law Journal. I would like to welcome
you here to the second panel of the day.
The Journal is currently publishing its nineteenth volume. The
past symposium issues are available outside on the desk. Please
feel free to take one. The transcript for this Symposium will be
published in our fourth book, available in the summer of 2009.

A PDF version of this Article is available online at http://iplj.net/blog/archives/
volumexix/book4. Visit http://iplj.net/blog/archives for access to the IPLJ archive.
*
Professor, Seton Hall Law School.
†
Professor, Fordham University School of Law.
‡
Deputy Legal Director & Kahle/Austin Promise Fellow, Public Knowledge.
§
Partner, Jenner & Block, LLP.

Professor, Franklin Pierce Law Center.
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I am pleased to introduce our moderator for the second panel,
dealing with copyright law and the potential effects on big and
small business.
Our moderator is David Opderbeck. He is a professor at Seton
Hall, where he teaches classes in patent law, comparative and
international intellectual property law. His writing focuses on law,
norms, and economics of intellectual property and information. In
addition to that, he is a musician, like myself.
Thank you for being here.
PROF. OPDERBECK: I will not sing for you. I’m sure you’re
glad of that.
We have an exciting panel, I think a very diverse panel,
looking at a couple of issues that may at first blush strike us as a
little bit arcane—statutory damages and “making available,” this
question of the Copyright Act allowing statutory award of
damages, and this question of what it means under U.S. copyright
to make a work available in the sense that it’s infringement. These
sort of arcane bits of copyright law come together in an interesting
legal, cultural, social milieu of digital distribution—the question of
what it means for people, for example, who are sharing or
distributing music online, digitally, on networks, to make
something available. When is it infringement? When, if ever,
should statutory damages be assessed for that sort of conduct?
These very abstruse issues come down into this very interesting
context.
We have a great group of speakers. I will introduce each
person as they prepare to talk.
Mary Wong is a professor of law at Pierce Law. She has a
wealth of academic and practice experience in the U.S. and
internationally, has practiced in Singapore and Brussels and
various other places. She specializes in digital technology and the
Internet, and the legal and regulatory challenges that this raises.
I will turn it over to Mary.
PROF. WONG: Thanks, David. Thank you to the editors,
Professor Hansen, and everyone at Fordham for having us here.
And don’t worry, I’m not about to sing either.
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[Slide] I was last here in this auditorium, with Hugh, I believe,
about eight months ago, for his big international IP conference,
speaking on a practically identical topic. 1 Eight months ago was
March 2008, which was after the trial in the Jammie Thomas peerto-peer file-sharing decision, 2 but before the three district court
opinions came down—not a full trial, but preliminary motions—
regarding the “making available” right. 3 Obviously, I have had a
lot of work to do since then.
At that time, I believe Hugh asked quite a few of us on the
panel what we thought was going to happen in the courts. I
declined to take a guess, being the risk-averse lawyer that I was.
Now I’m just going to have to deal with the consequences.
Essentially, I’m going to focus my talk, in the brief time I have
available, not on going through each case, but trying to summarize
them, to see where the general state of U.S. law is in relation to the
international context, which, as I think everybody knows, are the
WIPO Internet treaties of 1996. 4 I will focus my remarks—this is
a copyright panel, and I don’t really want to get into broadcasting,
performers, and performances—on the WIPO Copyright Treaty, 5
or the “WCT.”
[Slide] My favorite thing at this point is always to ask people,
when they ask me to do a talk like this, what do you understand by
the “making available” right? Everyone goes, “Well, maybe it’s
distribution, and wherever it appears in the treaty.” My response
to that is that it appears in the treaty in two places, in Article 6 and
Article 8. We normally speak of Article 6 as the distribution
right. 6 You will notice in wording I have reproduced of Article 6
1

The Challenges and Opportunities of Copyright in the Web 2.0, in 10 FORDHAM
INTELLECTUAL PROP. INST., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Ch. V.C.1 (Hugh
Hansen ed., Hart Publishing, forthcoming 2009).
2
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008).
3
Elektra Entm’t Group, Inc. v. Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d 234, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 2008);
London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Mass. 2008); Atlantic
Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976 (D. Ariz. 2008).
4
WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65
(1997); WIPO Performances and Phonogram Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No.
105-17, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997).
5
WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 4.
6
Id. art. 6.
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the word “distribution” does not appear, which always creates an
interesting issue for U.S. lawyers. 7 The second place that it
appears is in Article 8, which is a communication-to-the-public
right. 8
So what the WIPO treaty does is, it deals with two different
rights, in Article 6 and Article 8, but the language of “making
available” appears in both places.
There’s a long history to the WIPO treaties that I don’t have
time to get into, but I think I should note here that they were meant
to update copyright law for the digital age. If you look back at the
Berne Convention, 9 you will notice that, obviously, dating from
1886 down to the 1971 revision, nothing really spoke to the digital
era. The Berne Convention also did not have a specific
distribution right, and the broadcasting rights were pretty patchy
and fragmented. So the WCT tried to bring it together, to fill in
some gaps, and to update international copyright norms.
The last thing I want to say before moving on to the U.S.
position about the WCT is that, recalling the two separate rights in
the two separate articles, one of the observations that
commentators have made about this is that there was, and there
still is, a division of sorts between the U.S. or common-law
approach to digital rights and those of the civil-law countries,
primarily many of the European countries. If I can just generalize,
in countries such as France and Germany, with regard to
exploitation, they really distinguish between exploitation of works
in a tangible way—hence Article 6—and the exploitation of works
in an intangible, such as communication, performances, and
transmissions—hence Article 8. In U.S. law, as you know, we
7

Id. art. 6(1) (“Authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of
authorizing the making available to the public of the original and copies of their works
through sale or other transfer of ownership.”).
8
Id. art. 8 (“[A]uthors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of
authorizing any communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means,
including the making available to the public of their works in such a way that members of
the public may access these works from a place and at a time individually chosen by
them.”).
9
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
revised Paris, July 24, 1971, amended Sept. 29, 1979, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221
(last revised July 24, 1971).
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don’t necessarily today have that distinction. Hopefully, I will
come back to some of these divisions and pointers as I go through
what the law is.
I’m trying really hard to stick to the time. I notice that there
isn’t one of those exploding timers that Professor Hansen is so
fond of. If I run out of time, too bad; if I have enough time, then
we can have more discussion.
[Slide] The basic question, if we are looking at copyright law
in the United States in an international context, with respect to the
WCT, is, are we in compliance? As everybody knows, back when
the diplomatic conference of the WCT was under way, which was
between 1994 and 1996, or thereabouts, the U.S. delegation took
the view that U.S. copyright law would comply with the
requirements as ultimately agreed of the WCT. That was twelve
years ago. As we know, there have been cases and developments
since.
So I want to look at that position twelve years later, in light of
the three or four cases we have, and see if the answer is still yes.
First, as a reminder, this is a section well-known—possibly not
terribly beloved—to everybody. We all know what it is. We have
that word “distribution,” and not the words “making available,” in
the U.S. Copyright Act, in section 106(3). 10 You will also notice
that in 106(3) we have reference to copies. 11 So a question arises
as to whether or not copies have to be fixed, tangible objects. Or
can they be electronic, intangible copies?
Thirdly, the transfer, in terms of the distribution, has to be, in
the words of the statute, through sale or other transfer of
ownership, and so forth.
So the question is, how do these provisions operate in the
digital context, and how do they operate in the context of the
WCT?

10

17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2006).
Id. (providing that the owner of a copyright has exclusive rights “to distribute copies
or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending”).
11
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I will then conclude my remarks with a brief observation on the
other rights I have noted here, which are the rights of public
performance and display. Where the right to distribute in our law
goes to Article 6, the others go to the Article 8.
[Slide] Here’s my attempt at a summary. This is like a thirtysecond walkthrough, four cases. I know that some of my fellow
panelists will be speaking to some of those cases and specific
points. What I have tried to do is to really bring together the end
result. Here are the bullet points:
It wasn’t so clear in early March 2008, because the argument
then was still ongoing, but it seems quite clear after these cases
that many of the district courts in the United States seem to be
displaying a trend towards holding that for the distribution right to
be impacted in the United States, an actual dissemination of copies
is required. In other words, the question that we were asking eight
months ago—does merely making available on your shared folder
on your computer a series of copies, of copyrighted works—just
the fact that you put them there in your publicly accessible folder,
the “making available” in that way—is that good enough to trigger
the 106(3) right?
As many of us know, those who were proposing this view were
relying on older pre-digital cases, such as the Fourth Circuit
Hotaling case. 12 These obviously were cases that the courts,
coming up, had to discuss. But it seems quite clear, as I said, that
having discussed prior precedent, the legislative history, as well as
the statutory language, what’s really interesting is that a number of
these district court opinions go into these various points at some
length. 13 It seems clear that we need a dissemination of actual
copies.
There are good things about clarity. There are good things for
peer-to-peer downloaders, sharers, and so forth, that we now know
what the law requires. But there are a couple of things that I think
12

Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199 (4th Cir.
1997).
13
See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 718–19 (9th Cir.
2007); Resnick v. Copyright Clearance Ctr., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 252, 258–59 (D. Mass.
2006).
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are still slightly open-ended—for example, the next couple of
points.
One question was if the person doing the download is an agent
of the plaintiff/copyright owner. As we all know, in many of the
music cases, it is a company called MediaSentry 14 that works for
the music companies. 15 If that company is an agent of the
plaintiff/copyright owner and they do the downloads, that’s not
really an unauthorized download, so that doesn’t trigger 106(3).
In an order in the Jammie Thomas case, 16 which, as many of
you know, was in September 2008, the judge ordered a new trial,
which was somewhat of a victory for many of the counsel and
advocates in favor of the defendant in that case. It seems that if the
defendant in question—and you could be an individual consumer,
as Jammie Thomas was, an individual Internet user, making
available by putting those copies in your shared P2P folder—if
what you do is considered to substantially assist someone to copy
at the other end, then it can constitute a download to trigger 106(3),
even if the download at the other end is done by the plaintiff’s
agent.
The second point here is, going back to a case a couple of
months prior to that, the London-Sire Records case out of
Massachusetts, 17 the judge there engaged in a fairly long and, I
think, thoughtful discussion of all the issues that I have outlined.
One of the things that he said was that on the record, depending on
what the facts are, depending on what is presented to the court,
even on a preliminary motion, a reasonable fact finder could infer
that there is a distribution if what you have done, as the defendant,
14

MediaSentry is a company that provided “media companies with the most effective
means available to globally detect, track and deter the unauthorized distribution of their
digital content.”
MediaSentry, Inc.—Solutions, http://www.mediasentry.com/
solutions/index.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2009). “As of March 30, 2009, MediaSentry,
Inc. operates as a subsidiary of MediaDefender, Inc.” Media Sentry Inc.—Private
Company Information, BUSSINESSWEEK, http://investing.businessweek.com/research/
stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=12072579.
15
In January, 2009 the Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”) stopped
using MediaSentry’s services. Sarah McBride, Changing Track, RIAA Ditches Media
Sentry, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2009, at B2.
16
See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1228 (D. Minn. 2008).
17
London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Mass. 2008).
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is to have completed all the necessary steps for a public
distribution. 18 Again, another slight open-ended possibility.
The courts then went on to handle the prior precedent in a case
like Hotaling, and they also went on in a number of cases to
dismiss the argument based on the word “authorized” in section
106. 19 I will not go into those, for lack of time. I think I have
made my point.
[Slide] Where does U.S. law now stand? Here again, I have
attempted to bring together the various cases, what was said, and in
light of the question I started off with: Does U.S. law comply with
the WTC? Where are we now?
I think the interesting thing here, as I said, is that there are a
couple of places where the courts have left something open:
Primarily, when do you complete all the necessary steps for a
public distribution? Secondly, none of these cases really, clearly
came out and said that in every case like this the defendant is never
liable for distribution. In each case, it was always on the facts.
For example, in the Howell case there was an issue of fact, at least
at that point in time, as to whether Mr. Howell had actually put the
music in his shared folder. 20 In the Jammie Thomas case, the
order for the new trial was primarily based on the fact that, given
the jury instructions that the judge then said were wrong, it wasn’t
quite clear whether the basis for the jury finding against the
defendant was on the reproduction right or the distribution right. 21
Ultimately, it means that in the U.S., if you make electronic
copies available, it could be distribution in some circumstances,
assuming that the transfer is by way of sale or other transfer of
ownership. Here again, I point you to London-Sire. If we are
talking about electronic copies, one of the biggest arguments is
always that it’s electronic; it’s not tangible. When you transfer or
18

Id. at 169.
See Venegas-Hernandez v. Asociación de Compositores, Editores de Música
Latinoamericana (ACEMLA), 424 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2005) for an interesting discussion of
the meaning of the words “to authorize” in 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
20
See Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976 (D. Ariz. 2008).
Howell alleged that a computer malfunction or third party was responsible for the
copyrighted music in his shared folder. Id. at 986.
21
See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1214 (D. Minn. 2008).
19
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when you disseminate or when you download or share across the
Internet, you, as the original holder of the copy, still retain your
copy. It’s just that another copy is made on the other side.
So in respect to traditional distribution, that doesn’t work,
because in traditional distribution of a book, let’s say, when you
dispose of your book, you dispose of your copy, that copy left your
possession.
So a lot of argument in these cases centered on that difference.
As I said, I point you to the London-Sire decision, which basically
said, “Well, our focus, if we are going to make sense of the
statutory language in the digital age, should be not on what the
transferor keeps, but on what the transferee gets,” which I think is
an interesting possibility. 22
[Slide] At this point I just want to highlight a case that
occurred in a completely different jurisdiction. The reason I want
to do this is that there are really very few cases on electronic
distribution, particularly in a peer-to-peer environment. But one
other case that I think is interesting for U.S. law comparative
purposes is the BitTorrent case in Hong Kong, 23 which was last
year, where the final appeal resulted in conviction for the
defendant because it was a criminal distribution case. 24
What I have done is picked up those parts in the Hong Kong
Court of Final Appeals decision which I think echo or seem to
work in parallel with what the U.S. courts are leaving open in the
Thomas and the London-Sire decisions. The one question that I
haven’t quite gotten my mind around is, even though we know that
distribution in the U.S. requires actual copies and those copies can
be electronic copies, when has the defendant completed the
necessary steps so that we can say distribution has taken place? As
we can see from the Hong Kong decision, there seems to be a
parallel in a different jurisdiction.

22

See London-Sire Records, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 173 (“[I]t is newly minted ownership
rights held by the transferee that concern [17 U.S.C. § 106(3)], not whether the transferor
gives up his own.”).
23
HKSAR v. Chan Nai Ming, [2005] H.K.C.U. 1469 (M.C.T.M.).
24
Chan Nai Ming v. HKSAR, [2007] H.K.C.U. 849 (C.F.A.).
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[Slide] Let me just conclude by showing you—this is just my
summary—what other common-law countries have done. I’m not
going to read this to you. I’m not going to give you a lecture on
the different statutory provisions. But I want to show you the
United Kingdom, being a major common-law jurisdiction, being an
implementer of the European Union Copyright Directive, 25 which
is very close in language to the WCT. You will notice that instead
of a distribution right, they have a right to issue copies to the
public, 26 which arguably is similar. In addition to a right of public
performance, they have a right to communicate the work to the
public—in this case, by electronic transmission. 27
So unlike the United States, where we have a bundle of rights
that talk about distribution, public performance, public display, but
do not mention communication to the public in any broader sense,
the U.K. seems to do that.
[Slide] Similarly, Australia. I picked Australia because, as
many of us know, Australia entered into a free-trade agreement
with the U.S. in 2004 that went into effect in 2005. 28 The
Australian copyright law has gone through a series of changes,
kind of with the objective of the WCT-type goal in mind, which is
to update for the digital age. Again, you see in Australia
something similar—in different statutory language, but a similar
structure—to the U.K.: a right to publish, not distribution (arguably
narrower); 29 a right to perform in public; 30 and a publiccommunication right. 31 Again, not quite the same as the U.S.
[Slide] Let me conclude by saying that I do think the U.S.
distribution right, as interpreted by the cases this year, does comply
with WCT Article 6. In fact, in the sense that Article 6 is confined
only to tangible copies, because of the European history, our law
25
Council Directive 2001/29, Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Copyrights and
Related Rights in the Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 (EC).
26
Copyrights, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48 § 16(1)(b) (Eng.).
27
Id. § 19(4).
28
U.S.-Austl. Free Trade Agreement, May 18, 2004, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Australia_FTA/Final_Text/asset
_upload_file148_5168.pdf.
29
Copyright Act, 1968, § 31(1)(a)(ii) (Austl.).
30
Id. § 31(1)(a)(iii).
31
Id. § 31(1)(a)(iv).
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goes a little bit further, in that in our law, in the U.K., in Australia,
and elsewhere, copies include electronic copies. So we are in
compliance and we go a little bit further.
With regard to the other provision in the WCT where “making
available” makes an appearance, the right of communication to the
public, 32 here’s where we get into interesting questions of U.S. law
that haven’t been answered by the courts. This is our public
performance and public display right. 33
As I said, we don’t have a separate communication to the
public the way the U.K. or Australia does, but we have a fairly
broad public performance and display right. That includes, as I
have highlighted on the slide, the right to transmit, and “transmit”
means to communicate by way of a device or process to some
place or people beyond the place it’s sent. 34
So I think technically we can also say that our law is in
compliance with WCT Article 8 35 as well. The one thing I want to
note in this regard is that in our law we confine the right of
transmission to a performance. It doesn’t capture a case where you
transmit a work or a copy of the work. You transmit a
performance of the work.
Those of you who are familiar with the ringtones decision 36
from, I believe, last year will notice that there can be a limitation,
because the transmission is of a performance and not a work.
With that, I hope that that little tour through current U.S. law
and the international context generated some thoughts that we can
explore in further discussion. Thank you.
PROF. OPDERBECK: We will proceed, I think, by having
each person give their talk and then we will have some discussion
and questions for everyone at the end.
32

“[A]uthors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of
authorizing any communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means,
including the making available to the public of their works.” WIPO Copyright Treaty, art.
8, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997).
33
17 U.S.C. § 106(4)–(5) (2006).
34
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
35
WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 32.
36
Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Determination Proceeding, 74
Fed. Reg. 4510 (Jan. 26, 2009) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 385).
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Our next speaker is Donald Verrilli. He is a partner at Jenner
& Block. He is well-known in circles involving these sorts of
issues as an attorney who argued before the United States Supreme
Court the Grokster 37 case. He also teaches as an adjunct professor
at Georgetown University, teaching First Amendment law.
Without further ado, Mr. Verrilli.
MR. VERRILLI: Thank you, David.
I want to follow on Mary’s very helpful assessment of what’s
going on out there in the law and let you know at the outset that
my focus on the “making available” issue arises directly from the
fact that I was asked over the summer to argue the post-trial
motion in this Jammie Thomas case 38 —obviously with less than
complete success, given the outcome there.
But I have spent some time in the last few months trying to
think this issue through. So let me give you my perspective on it.
Let me start by saying that one place where I guess I would
express a respectful disagreement with Mary is that I think the law
is really still quite unsettled in this area, both for the reasons that
Mary identified and by virtue of the fact that you have a few
district court cases reaching this decision, and none of them, it
seems to me, with the possible partial exception of the Thomas
case, have come to grips with what I think is a very significant
reality, which is that I think the Supreme Court has actually
already spoken on this issue. I’ll talk about that a little bit in a
minute.
The “making available” issue—we talk about it as though the
question is whether there is an exclusive right to make available
your work under domestic law, as there may be under the treaties
that Mary described. But, of course, the real question is actually a
different one. It’s whether a copyright owner’s exclusive right to
distribute works is infringed by actions such as putting works in
your share folder on Kazaa or LimeWire or setting up a Web site
where you can download works without authorization—whether

37
38

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008).
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that kind of action infringes the copyright owner’s exclusive right
to distribute.
I think that the argument against coming to the conclusion that
such conduct violates the right to distribute starts from the wrong
place. I think the argument against concluding that “making
available” is distribution thinks about this as though what we were
talking about here was a prohibitory statute, a statute that says,
“Thou shalt not do X. That shalt not distribute without
authorization.” Then you think about “distribute” as though it’s an
element of a criminal offense and you say at most putting stuff in
your share folder is like an attempt to distribute, and unless the
statute penalizes attempt, there is no violation.
I think that argument starts at the wrong place, because what
we are talking about here is something different. Section 106
grants a copyright owner an exclusive right to do and to authorize
certain things, one of which is the distribution of works. 39 Then
the violation here is whether someone else infringes your exclusive
right to do the distributing. That’s the question: Does the conduct
here, “making available,” infringe your exclusive right to do the
distributing?
I think when you think about it that way, it’s very hard to say
that it doesn’t, because, after all, if it’s okay to put works in your
Lime Wire share folder or your Kazaa share folder, where they are
available for other people to download, then it’s also okay to set up
a Web site that is called “Comeandgetit.com,” in which you upload
copies of all your favorite music and videos and allow people to
download them without that being a distribution. It’s very hard to
see why we would want to say that that conduct is okay up to the
point at which somebody actually downloads, at which point it all
becomes an unlawful act.
That seems to me, frankly—although obviously I was not able
to persuade the judge in the Thomas case of this—like kind of a
silly reading of the statute. It turns the whole thing into a game of
cat-and-mouse. It’s not a violation, not a violation, not a violation,
and then the minute you can observe somebody downloading, it’s a
violation.
39

17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2006).
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So I think the question you have to ask yourself is, why would
you have such an interpretation of the law? What sense does that
make? It can’t be right that you want to encourage people to put
copyrighted works into their share folder so that they can be
downloaded with authorization, just as it can’t be right that you
want to encourage people to set up Comeandgetit.com, where they
can come and download copyrighted works. It can’t be that. That
just seems crazy.
So it has to be that there are some kinds of collateral
consequences from recognizing making work available as a
distribution. I think the answer there is that, yes, there may be
some hard cases, but the law has done a pretty effective job, even
before the digital era, in drawing distinctions between
transmissions, which are not distributions, and distributions. I
think, as long as you can figure that line out, there really aren’t any
collateral consequences that would force you to come to the
conclusion that a result, on its own terms, seems at best highly
counterintuitive as to where the law should be.
Apart from those policy issues, I think the big problem that the
argument against finding liability based on “making available”
faces is the Supreme Court’s decision in New York Times v.
Tasini. 40 As I prepared to do this argument in the Thomas case, it
became quite clear to me that the Tasini case has a great deal to say
on the topic that we are talking about today. This is a case, you
remember, where the New York Times and the operators of the
LexisNexis database were sued by authors for copyright
infringement, works that were written for the Times, for example,
part of a collective work. The Times gave a license to LexisNexis
on the basis of its right to transfer rights in a collective work under
section 201 of the Copyright Act, 41 and then LexisNexis and
another database made these articles available for download not
only as a collective whole, but individually. The question was
whether the individual downloads took them outside the privilege.

40
41

N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
Id. at 483–84.
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The Court concluded that the individual downloads took them
outside the privilege. 42 But that’s not what’s key. What’s key
about the case is that the Supreme Court said over and over again,
affirming the Second Circuit’s final judgment, summary judgment,
on this issue, that the authors’ rights not only to control
reproduction, but also to control distribution, were violated by
reason of the fact that their articles appeared in the LexisNexis
database and appeared in the other database that was at issue. 43 In
fact, the New York Times in that case made a huge to-do, both in its
cert petition, to get cert granted, and on the merits, of saying,
“Look, there was not any evidence in this case that anybody ever
downloaded any one of these articles that you are suing on.
There’s no evidence of that whatsoever.” 44
They said, “Therefore, in the absence of that evidence, the
most you could possibly sue us for is secondary copyright liability.
The most you can sue us for is essentially aiding and abetting an
unlawful act of direct infringement, which would be accomplished
by the person who did the download.”
They said, “Since there’s no evidence in this case of direct
liability, you can’t hold us liable for secondary liability, so we
walk off scot-free.”
The Court rejected that argument quite expressly in the
decision, 45 which, it seems to me, is exactly the same argument
that’s being made in the “making available” context with respect to
Kazaa and LimeWire. The Court said that there is an unlawful
distribution by virtue of the fact that these works appear in the
database, where they are available to be downloaded, even in a

42

Id. at 493.
Id. at 500–01.
44
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (No. 00-201) (quoting
respondents as representing that there were no claims that “end users have engaged in
acts of direct infringement”).
45
Tasini, 533 U.S. at 504 (“The Publishers suggest that their Databases could be liable
only under a theory of contributory infringement, based on end-user conduct, which the
Authors did not plead. The Electronic Publishers, however, are not merely selling
“equipment”; they are selling copies of the Articles. And, as we have explained, it is the
copies themselves, without any manipulation by users, that fall outside the scope of the §
201(c) privilege.”).
43
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case in which there is not a scintilla of evidence that anyone
actually downloaded it.
I think this really becomes clearly illuminated when one goes
back to the Second Circuit’s decision, 46 which the Supreme Court
affirmed, where this issue was discussed at length in Tasini.
So in terms of where the law is headed on this issue, I think it
is headed to a confrontation with Tasini, which is going to have to
be worked out in the courts of appeals. How is it going to be
worked out? Can Tasini be distinguished? Maybe. But it’s very
hard for me to see how it can, because this issue was actually
briefed in Tasini and actually decided in Tasini. Therefore, it
doesn’t seem to me that a court of appeals, acting in good faith as
an inferior court, has really got a lot of room to maneuver on this
issue.
But getting past the precedent issue, what’s really going on
here? I think this is one of these issues where it seems to me that
the concern here is about the damages that flow from finding
liability based on the existence of these works in the share folder,
as opposed to the logic that leads you to the conclusion that this is
actually an infringement of the exclusive right to distribute. It’s
the concern, isn’t it really, that if you have 800 works in your
folder and you can get statutory damages for 800 of those works,
that can be a gigantic number, and that doesn’t seem right
somehow.
But that seems to me to be an issue that ought to be addressed
in terms of asking questions about whether you need fine-tuning of
the damages regime, not by reaching what seems to be a borderline
illogical conclusion about what it means to have an exclusive right
to distribute, in what would have to be, really, a terribly tortured
interpretation of the Supreme Court’s Tasini decision.
I think one way, just to bring it to a close, is to think about,
shouldn’t you be able to get an injunction against
Comeandgetit.com if you are a copyright owner and your stuff is
up there available for download? Shouldn’t you be able to go to
court and get an injunction that says they have to stop this? Is it
46

N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 206 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 1999).
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really the case that you couldn’t get an injunction unless you
caught them in the act of downloading, which, after all, is
exceedingly difficult thing to do in this era of encryption, with
such ease of evasion?
If you can get an injunction in that context, then it has to be
that this is something that should not be allowed to happen. Then
again it brings you back to the question—it really does seem to me
that all it comes down to is the question, what are the appropriate
damages that ought to be assessed in a situation like that one? Is
there sufficient room in the statutory regime to accommodate that?
To me, I think that’s what the question is here, really, not about
whether this is an infringement of your exclusive right to
distribute. It’s very hard for me to see how it is.
With that, I’ll turn over the podium.
PROF. OPDERBECK: Our next speaker is Sherwin Siy. He’s
a staff attorney and director at the Global Knowledge Initiative.
He has significant experience in the policy aspects of these
questions that we are dealing with.
I will turn it over to you, Sherwin.
MR. SIY: Thanks.
A lot of what I was going to say about “making available” was
said by Prof. Wong, and as Mr. Verrilli kept going, I think more
different, interesting things that I wanted to cover came up as well.
So I apologize. This is going to be a little bit disjointed, at least at
first, as I talk about the “making available” right.
As for why you want to have this line that people can walk up
to and yet not cross, I think a lot of that does have to do with the
fact that copyright infringement is a strict liability crime, a strict
liability offense, and that for something where you have such
bright lines in drawing the offense, you are going to want to have a
bright-line way of distinguishing what is and isn’t an infringement
as well.
As for Comeandgetit.com, I don’t think that anybody is
arguing that the existence of a site and the lack of actual direct
evidence of a download is the end of the inquiry. I think it’s pretty
clear—for example, just looking at copying, you can infer copying.
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There is circumstantial proof of copying, even if you can’t sit there
and say, “I saw you copy that score from George Gershwin.” You
can say, “It’s substantially similar. You had access to the work.”
You can infer that. The fact that you didn’t have an eyewitness
sitting there watching the copying occur is not a complete bar. It’s
not even necessarily a particularly hard bar to meet.
I think the same idea wouldn’t be illogical to apply in this case.
The fact that somebody sticks it out on the Web and it has been up
for days and they have had site traffic, I think, can lead to a very
reasonable inference.
As for the unintended consequences, and why this matters—
initially, I was going to talk about the “making available” right in a
couple of ways. There are two questions, really. Question 1 is,
does it matter? Does it matter in the context of whether or not the
United States is compliant with WTC or Berne? The reason I’m
asking if it matters is that while it is a very interesting question and
a relevant question, at the level of international law and
compliance with international law, at the ground level, if you are
talking about the individual record label, if you are talking about
the individual file sharer, the question really is, as Mr. Verrilli said,
is this a violation of the distribution right? So we look only at the
distribution right and how that has been interpreted.
The second reason why I would ask if it matters is that,
actually, in the cases we are talking about here and in these sort of
nightmare scenarios of Comeandgetit.com—the blatant infringer—
or even just talking about the file sharers that we are trying to see
that the law applies to in this situation, there is always going to be
a direct infringement somewhere along the line. You are talking
about either the infringement created when that individual first
made a copy of that work or the infringement that occurs when that
copy gets shared. The process of that sharing, I think, as has been
covered, does much more closely resemble a reproduction.
That does sort of get towards the idea that this might be
appropriately dealt with, if we are talking about the second
reproduction, with secondary infringement. Again, that does
require somebody showing that there is a direct infringement
occurring, just as if we assume that distribution requires somebody
to actually have transferred ownership of a copy, we need to have
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some evidence, direct or circumstantial, of that having happened.
The fact that expanding the distribution right to encompass
“making available” seems to get around both of those is what
makes me nervous. It seems to be an attempt to either work
around the need for a direct infringer on the secondary liability
side or to work around the need to show an actual distribution on
the direct infringement side.
As for why we don’t want to do this, I think these bad
cases―where the rights of transmission and the rights of
distribution, the rights for public performance and display have
been mingled―aren’t isolated outliers.
These are actually
situations that crop up time and time again. We saw it happened
when XM was sued for making a satellite radio receiver that could
actually record the broadcasts they received.47 They had a license,
of course, for the public performance of the works. They didn’t
have a license for the distribution of the works. That suit ended up
settling. 48
We have disputes for licensing terms among online music
retailers and rights holders. There was a case a couple of years ago
out of the consent decree in the Southern District of New York
talking about whether or not buying a song from Yahoo! Music or
iTunes or Amazon could also be a public performance, because as
it’s being downloaded, I could also play it simultaneously. 49
Even though that came out in the right way, it keeps happening
over and over again. We have Cablevision. 50 We have constant
battles over section 115 51 and the limits of what a digital
phonorecord delivery is and whether or not you are going to also
implicate performances in that. 52 So it’s a question that is not
47

Atlantic Recording Corp. v. XM Satellite Radio, Inc., 81 U.S.P.Q.2D 1407
(S.D.N.Y 2007).
48
Associated Press, XM, Universal Music Reach Settlement, MOTLEY FOOL, Dec. 17,
2007, http://www.fool.com/news/associated-press/2007/12/17/xm-universal-music-reachsettlement.aspx.
49
United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers (ASCAP), 485 F.
Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y 2007).
50
Cartoon Network L.P., v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).
51
17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006) (providing for compulsory licensing which allows the
making and distribution of physical phonorecords and digital phonorecord deliveries).
52
See ASCAP, 485 F. Supp. 2d at 446–47.
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going to go away. It’s a question that still hasn’t been completely
settled. It’s a question that, I think, mucking about with the
boundaries of the 106 rights is going to make much worse, much
more unsettled, and much harder to deal with.
Following on from that, one of the things Mr. Verrilli said that
I do really agree with is that a lot of this is based around statutory
damages. I have particular concerns with “making available” in
and of itself, but I think a lot of the reason we have a lot of concern
in a lot of cases is because of how statutory damages work. There
has been a fair amount of news recently about how there is going
to be a challenge to the constitutionality of high statutory damages
in Tenenbaum. 53 There are a number of good arguments that could
be made in that context. The due process considerations of high
damages might not just apply to punitive damages, but might also
apply to certain statutory damages. 54 In the end, though—I’m not
going to claim expertise in constitutional due process law (I’ll
leave the intricacies of those arguments to the experts)—from a
policy standpoint, the question is, even if there are structural
differences between punitive damages and statutory damages, isn’t
the problem still the same? We are still facing a situation where
actual damages totaling around $54 are awarded $222,000 in
damages instead. 55 That’s even an order of magnitude less than
the maximum allowable under the statutory-damages schedule. 56
I think it’s worthwhile to see how that range of statutory
damages got to where it is. It is a large range. It goes from $750

53

See David J. Goodman, Legal Jujitsu in a File-Sharing Copyright Case, N.Y. TIMES
LEDE BLOG, Nov. 18, 2008, http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/18/legal-jujitsu-ina-file-sharing-copyright-case; see also Tenenbaum: Are Copyright Law’s Statutory
Damages Unconstitutional for NonCommercial File Sharers?, GROKLAW, Mar. 16, 2009,
http://www.groklaw.net/article.php?story=20090310172906129.
54
See Capital Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1212 (D. Minn. 2008)
(noting that Thomas’ argument is “that the amount of the statutory damages award is
excessive and in violation of the due process clause”).
55
Id. at 1227.
56
See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2006). Under the statutory-damages schedule, an owner
can recover at a maximum $30,000, unless there is willfulness, for any one work. Id. §
504(c)(1)–(2). Because Thomas involved the infringement of twenty-four songs, 579 F.
Supp. 2d at 1227, Thomas could have been potentially liable for up to $720,000.

VOL19_BOOK4_COPYRIGHT PANEL

2009]

COPYRIGHT: “MAKING AVAILABLE”

11/16/2009 6:43:57 AM

989

to $30,000. 57 That’s without even considering willfulness, up to
$150,000, or the innocent infringer, down to $200. 58
But I think the reason we have such a wide range has to do
with the fact that there is only one award of statutory damages per
work infringed. 59 A commercial pirate making thousands and
thousands of copies of one work—if statutory damages are sought,
the maximum amount is $150,000. 60 If you have a casual file
sharer downloading one track, the maximum amount is
$150,000. 61
This is a bit strange. But it seems that this was enacted to
counteract a different strangeness that was present in the 1909 Act.
In 1909, the statutory damages were calculated via this
extraordinarily detailed, complex schedule. 62 But the general rule
was that you had a range of statutory damages and that you could
multiply that range by the number of copies made. 63
This led to extreme complications for innocent infringers, for
example. If an infringer just makes one misjudgment as to the
state of the law or there is a mistake in the licensing process
somehow, suddenly he can find himself bankrupted, depending
upon the breadth of the circulation. The multipliers meant that
innocent infringers actually ended up finding themselves paying a
lot more than willful infringers or deliberate infringers, or at least
non-innocent infringers, who just made a few copies.
The eventual solution to that, legislatively, was—and this was
due to an outcry from, among others, the motion picture and the
recording industry 64 —was that there would be one award of
damages per work infringed, but that award would be within a
57

17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1).
Id. § 504(c)(2).
59
Id. § 504(c)(1).
60
Id. § 504(c)(2).
61
Id.
62
Copyright Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 391, § 101(b), 61 Stat. 652, 661 (1947)
(codifying the amended Copyright Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 25(b), 35 Stat. 1075,
1081 (1909)).
63
Id.
64
Register of Copyrights, Copyright Law Revision: Report of the Register of
Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law 104 (H. Comm. Print
1961).
58
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larger range, a range which was, actually, at the high end, nearly
doubled, so that you could deter a mass infringement that a noninnocent infringer would be making. 65
This change that happened between the 1909 and the 1976
Act—if we look at how it applies to digital works—it’s actually
fairly helpful, at least along one axis. After all, if we count the
number of times that a work gets copied if I email an article from
my computer to somebody else’s, then, just by the nature of how
computers work, more copies of that get made than would happen
in an analog context if I were to simply mail a clipping or mail a
photocopy. Copies get made in terms of the RAM. Copies get
made in various places in the hard drive cache. If I’m working off
of a Web mail server, there are intermediary servers in which
copies get made, and then a whole host of copies made on the
recipient’s computer as well. If we were using 1909-style statutory
damages, then anytime something was digital, you would
automatically have a multiplier.
So it’s a good thing we don’t count the number of copies alone.
It’s a good thing that that is not the key factor in multiplying
statutory damages.
But in moving away from that, the range went from $250-to$5,000 to $250-to-$10,000, 66 and through a couple of other
amendments since then, to our current range, $750-to-$30,000. 67
That still leaves us, as I said before, with a commercial
infringer placed in the same boat as a high school student. Why
has that happened? Where is that coming from?
I think at least part of the reason is that in 1976—given that it
is far more recent than 1909, but it’s still 1976—we were talking
about a different class of defendants that were appearing in the
courts than those that we see today with P2P litigation.
I remember, I was attending an anniversary of a tech law
society a couple of years ago. People kept talking about how just
fifteen years ago, we would have an IP society or an IP journal and
65
66
67

H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 162–63 (1976).
17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (1976).
17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2006).
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we would have just a handful of people show up. It was sort of
this arcane thing. People were interested in very specific aspects
of it. People were interested in publishing or people were
interested in entertainment law. But now copyright touches a lot
more people. It affects a lot more people, and a lot more people
are exposed to how copyright applies on the Internet.
While private individuals were capable of technically
committing copyright infringement in 1909 and 1976, they weren’t
in the crosshairs of the copyright holders. This isn’t the sort of
thing that was really considered by the legislature or by the courts
as much. Copying a book out line by line, by hand, on the
typewriter, photocopying pages—it’s not something that caught the
attention or required the attention of the copyright holder to the
extent that file sharing is capturing the attention of copyright
holders today.
That system works if you are dealing with a world where
infringers are largely sophisticated entities, where you are dealing
with people who are in the business of publishing, in the business
of putting out copyrighted works; and secondly, where you are
dealing with an activity that addresses one work at a time.
But now we are dealing with a damage structure meant to
account for many, many copies of one work, only multiplied by the
number of works involved. Now what we are talking about in a
number of cases—and not just in the peer-to-peer file-sharing
cases—is about one or two copies of a work made, or at least one
or two functional copies of a work made, accounting for the digital
environment, and one or two copies of many works made. We are
talking about an activity for each work that doesn’t implicate
thousands of copies, that isn’t going to implicate thousands of
dollars of actual damages. Yet we are talking about a large
number of works.
If we look at that structure and we look at what is happening,
we have to ask if this range of damages—if the statute as it has
been constructed is serving its purpose. I don’t think it is. On the
one hand, if we are talking about using higher numbers to account
for the possibility of massive multiple infringers of a work, that’s
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fine. That’s what it was there for. But that’s not how the larger
end of the damages scale was used in the Thomas case. 68 It’s not
how it’s used in settlement letters that are sent to individual file
sharers, 69 where they say, “Under the statute, you could be liable
for $150,000 per track. We’ll go somewhere in the middle. You
know what? We’ll give you a great deal. You pay us a few
thousand dollars for a few hundred tracks. You’re getting off
lightly.”
If we are talking about using these larger numbers purely as a
deterrent effect, I think that that is actually not working very well
to stop file sharing. There is certainly a percentage of users that
aren’t sharing files because of the feared suit, but I think $750 per
track, at the minimum, is a more than sufficient deterrent. It’s a
more than sufficient deterrent for me. At $750 a track or $500 a
track, even $200, I would be bankrupt if I was engaging in file
sharing. Having somebody liable for over $1 million isn’t going to
have a significantly larger deterrent effect.
That’s assuming that it was purely deterrence that was the
reason for them being inched up higher. I don’t think that’s the
case. If you look at some of the jury statements made after the
Thomas case, 70 they talked about, “Well, we think she lied to us,”
which would go to her credibility, which would go to whether or
not she was actually liable. 71 But it seems that there is a punitive
aspect to that as well.
So there are some problems with statutory damages. I think the
follow-on problem from them is the fact that—the fact that
statutory damages are so high—they serve as the engine by which
we find a number of abuses and inefficiencies and losses of
information due to the chilling effect that they have upon uses of
copyrighted works.

68

Capital Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1227 (D. Minn. 2008).
For an example of a settlement letter, see Letter from Donald J. Kelso, Attorney,
Holme
Roberts
&
Owen
L.L.P.,
(Feb.
28,
2007),
available
at
http://net.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/CSD4832.pdf.
70
See generally Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008).
71
David Kravets, RIAA Juror: ‘We Wanted to Send a Message’, WIRED, Oct. 9, 2007,
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/10/riaa-juror-we-w.html.
69
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In the patent panel this morning, they were talking about how,
pre-eBay, the presumption of an injunction was this hammer that
could be used to bring trolls out of the woodwork. 72 By the same
token, having extraordinarily high statutory damages can act as a
hammer in the copyright context.
There are several chilling effects that people have mentioned.
We have takedown notices that are backed up by the threat of
an infringement suit. 73 We have filmmakers very hesitant in
approaching the use of incidental IP in movies. 74 We have orphan
works. 75 There are a lot of other activities that walk along the line
of what may or may not be infringement. Sometimes they cross
that line. But the more that statutory damages are brought to bear,
the higher these penalties are, the further people are going to back
away from that line, leaving sort of this no-man’s land of actually
extraordinarily useful and good activities.
I think the idea of what copyright clearances are required,
forcing licensing payments or preventing works from reaching the
public—I think there are a number of examples of that. 76 In the
interest of time, I will skip over that.
The question of orphan works, the fact that large statutory
damages can prevent somebody from bringing a work whose
author can’t be located to the public—they can’t get a reasonable

72

Symposium, Cross-Licensing and Injunctions—the Interplay Between Big Business,
Small Business, and Non-Practicing Inventors, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 925, 962–63 (2009).
73
See, e.g., Ryan Singel, Universities Baffled by Massive Surge in RIAA Copyright
Notices, WIRED, Apr. 30, 2008, http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/04/riaa-sendsspik.html.
74
See generally Jen Swanson, Beg, Borrow, or Steal? Deciphering Fair Use for
Filmmakers, INDEPENDENT, Feb. 10, 2009, http://www.aivf.org/magazine/2009/02/
fairuse; CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA, DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS’ STATEMENT OF BEST
PRACTICES IN FAIR USE (2005), http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/
fair_use_final.pdf.
75
See generally REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS (2006),
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report-full.pdf.
76
See Volunteer Lawyers & Accountants for the Arts (VLAA)—The Clearance
Culture, http://www.vlaa.org/filminfo_theclearanceculture.asp (last visited Nov. 14,
2009) (referencing Eye on the Prize and other documentary films that had problems with
copyright clearances).
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license because they can’t find the author, and yet they are not
willing to run the risk of statutory damages to bring that forward.
I think both of these topics actually—I have gone on, I think,
with the idea that these are two sort of separate areas. They are
both of concern. I think one of the reasons they are both of
concern is that they both seem to be a little bit kludgy. For the
“making available” question, we have reproduction rights; 77 we
have public performance rights; 78 we have display rights; 79 we
have the distribution right. 80 They all fit together. So it’s not
necessary to expand distribution out so that it overlaps with these
others, because it leads to some of these other effects.
By the same token, I think the statutory-damages provisions, as
they were drafted, end up being kludged into a much different
technological and factual situation.
I think what we need to do is respect the nuances and
distinctions drawn in section 106, 81 and at some point in the future,
hopefully, we can address the need for nuance in the structure of
504(c). 82
PROF. OPDERBECK: Thank you.
Our last speaker is Hugh Hansen, well-known to you all here,
on the faculty here at Fordham Law School. He teaches
intellectual property law, international IP.
We’ll turn it over to Hugh.
PROF. HANSEN: This so far has been a reasonable discussion
of what constitutes “making available,” and what is the proper role
for statutory damages. I hope I won’t change that.
Do we need a “making available” right?

77

See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2006); see also Motown Record Co.
v. DePietro, Civ. No. 04-2246, 2007 WL 576284, at *3 n.38 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2007);
William Patry, A Making Available Right?, http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2007/
03/making-available-right.html (Mar. 2, 2007, 11:39 EST).
78
17 U.S.C. § 106(4).
79
Id. § 106(5).
80
Id. § 106(3).
81
Id. § 106.
82
17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006).
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There is a spectrum of opinion on how much protection works
should have in general and online, in particular. The Electronic
Frontier Foundation (“EFF”), 83 for instance, is over at one end, and
has made an argument to the effect that in the digital world there is
no “distribution” for copyright purposes, 84 leaving people free to
do many things with copyrighted works without constraints. The
district court rejected that position. 85 Some copyright owners
might be described as hyper-protective, leaving little room for any
unauthorized use of works online.
Is the “making available” right a crucial component of
protection or is it just something to plug a hole in the peer-to-peer
downloading scenario? And do we need it even for that? We
could do without it if we used a broad commonsense construction
of distribution. We could reach downloading explicitly through a
Copyright Act amendment, although that would be very unlikely.
As Sherwin indicated, maybe the reproduction right, by itself, can
provide the protection. It seems as if whatever the doctrinal
problems, the courts are cognizant of the dilemma copyright
owners are in with regard to peer-to-peer downloading.
Mary demonstrated that a lot of district courts had trouble with
the “making available” right being construed as part of the
distribution right. But even if the courts had trouble with it, they
let the cases continue. They didn’t dismiss the cases.86 This is
important because letting the case continue is a pragmatic victory
for the copyright holder. Going through discovery and trial
preparation is expensive for defendants who generally have much
less money than the copyright owners. And then the case is left up
to the jury, and juries might be less inclined that judges in parsing
the doctrinal niceties of the making available right. If the
defendant is viewed as a “bad guy” or liar, he or she will generally
lose.
83

Electronic Frontier Foundation, http://www.eff.org (last visited Nov. 14, 2009).
Amicus Curiae Brief of the Electronic Frontier Foundation in Support of
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, Elektra Entm’t Group, Inc. v. Barker, 551
F. Supp. 2d 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 05-7340), 2006 WL 738703.
85
Elektra Entm’t Group, Inc. v. Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d 234, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
86
See, e.g., London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Mass. 2008);
Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Brennan, 534 F. Supp. 2d 278 (D. Conn. 2008); Atlantic
Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976 (D. Ariz. 2008).
84
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For instance, the jury in the Thomas 87 case did not seem to
have much trouble finding the defendant liable. In fact, they were
upset with what she did. She was a sophisticated person who in
college had written an article on Napster, and had supposedly
downloaded thousands of files. They only litigated twenty-four
downloads, 88 because no judge would allow time for doing much
more than that. Moreover, she clearly lied about a number of
things in making her defense, and some jurors afterward were
particularly incensed about that.
At the end of the day, she’s not going to pay a cent. It might be
a pyrrhic victory, at least in financial terms, for the RIAA. She,
practically speaking, is judgment-proof. Whether it’s $220,000 89
or $8,000 or $750, she is going to end up paying nothing.
While statutory damages are very important in copyright
litigation, in peer-to-peer litigation they play less of a role, at least
in terms of actually getting damages, for the reasons just discussed.
Whether they provide a disincentive to download, by themselves,
is doubtful. Bringing actions might provide a disincentive to
download if there are enough of those actions to make
downloaders feel at risk. In fact, the large possible statutory
damages might hurt the cause of the record industry and provide
unfavorable PR.
I don’t think that the statutory damages regime is at risk. It has
a long history. The Statute of Anne had a statutory-damage
provision. 90 At least three state laws before 1790, before the
federal statute, had statutory damage. 91 The first copyright statute
in 1790 had statutory damages. 92 Various revisions by Congress
maintained or increased statutory damages over the years. One
87

Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008).
Id. at 1227.
89
Id.
90
Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19, § 2 (Eng.).
91
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 351 (1998) (citing U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS: LAWS PASSED IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE
1783 RELATING TO COPYRIGHT, Bulletin No. 3, 4 (rev. ed. 1963)) (noting that state law in
Massachusetts, Rhode Island and New Hampshire provided for statutory damages before
Congress passed the 1790 Act).
92
Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 2, 1 Stat. 124, 125 (amended 1831, 1909,
1962, 1976, 1998).
88
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revision did take the maximum down from $10,000 to $5,000, 93
but that was at the request of someone who was worried he was
going to lose cases because there was too much possible exposure
and they would, thus, not find liability.
There is a long felt need for statutory damages in copyright
cases because it is difficult to prove copyright damages, and very
expensive. And we have a long tradition in the U.S. against
speculative damages. 94
So from the beginning, it has been, “Okay, proof is going to be
a problem. But there is certainly harm that needs to be addressed.
So we’ll use statutory damages.”
I think Sherwin did a good job of trying to get at what the
possibilities are for innocent infringers. But the reality is, there
aren’t going to be innocent infringers. The RIAA is not going to
waste a lot of money on a lawsuit against somebody who
innocently downloaded or even intentionally downloaded but only
did a little. It’s just not worth it financially. They are going to go
after whom they want to deter—the people who have done it on a
relatively large scale. And Thomas did a tremendous amount. As
noted, she was only accused in the litigation of 24 downloads but
that’s simply the reality of case management and what judges will
allow.
So I’m just wondering if we are really even facing the reality of
this. Don says, “Can it be all right, Comeandgetit.com?” Yes, a
lot of people think it is all right, Comeandgetit.com. That’s really
what is coming on here. We have a lot of people for whom
downloading in the digital environment is OK or for some it is
almost philosophically a right. If technology makes it possible to
do it, you should be allowed to do it. Of course, technological
advances can’t be used by copyright owners. It is a one-way street.
For various reasons very few people come out publicly and say
downloading is wrong. I imagine that Sherwin thinks that it is
93

Copyright Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 25, 35 Stat. 1075, 1081 (amended 1962,
1976, 1998).
94
See, e.g., 25 C.J.S. Damages § 38 (2008) (“The rule, applicable in actions of
contract and in actions of tort, is that uncertain, contingent, or speculative damages may
not be recovered.”).
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wrong but he had a long talk and did not once say it is wrong.
More people need to say it’s wrong. We need fewer excuses and
justifications and more criticism.
Part of the problem is that the RIAA and record companies
have a horrible reputation. In fact, many people from both sides of
the copyright debate think that record companies have been
horrible to their own, to others—everybody. So unauthorized
downloading of music is probably the worst-case scenario on
which to base a test of digital uses of copyrighted works.
Nevertheless, I think the courts all the way up to the Supreme
Court will be supportive of ways to stop a practice that can destroy
industries for no better reason than the instant gratification of the
downloader. When the Supreme Court and lower courts have
faced new technology, they have been open to finding ways to
asses the development of the technology. So piano rolls, 95 cable
television, 96 videocassette recorders 97 —were all examples where
the courts in effect nurtured new technology that produced a new
revenue stream for the copyright owners. It limited the need for
that technology to pay for the copyrighted works that it carried or
used. On the other hand, when courts have been faced with a new
technology that does not produce a new revenue stream and can
decimate the industry, they have come up with approaches that
required licensing. One example is Justice Brandeis and the
multiple-performance doctrine. He was actually a populist who
was generally anti-intellectual property, yet he came up with the
doctrine that made multiple music-industry players pay a license
fee for the same broadcast of a musical work. 98 A second example

95

White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908). A piano roll is a roll
of paper with perforated holes that is used in the operation of player pianos. For more
background on the mechanics of the piano roll and its place in the development of
copyright, see Wikipedia—Piano Roll, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Piano_roll (last
visited Nov. 14, 2009).
96
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968)
(superceded by statute).
97
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
98
Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931). For discussion on
Multiple Performance Doctrine, see 2-8 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.18 (2007).
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is Grokster. 99 Had the Court in Grokster followed the precedent
set in Sony 100 it would have wreaked havoc on the music industry
by greenlighting predatory, peer-to-peer venues.
The U.S.
Supreme Court, however, in effect shot down the precedent in
Sony in order to stop Grokster. 101
I think what ultimately the courts are going to do is ask what is
the problem and what is the solution? What is right and what is
wrong? If they think this peer-to-peer making available is the
source of a lot of problems, they will construe distribution or
reproduction to cover this practice. If they think, on the other
hand, such an approach would present danger to innocent
infringers and/or advancement of technology, they won’t.
I think that’s really the debate. The debate isn’t the WCT, the
WIPO Copyright Treaty, whether we are in conformance with it or
not. Nobody cares. So I don’t think whether we are or are not in
conformance with it is going to have much effect. I think,
ultimately, it’s technology, morality, the role of copyright,
creativity, all these things rolled into one. That’s how the case has
to be argued.
I think, actually, if more of these cases go to juries, the
downloaders will continue to lose.
Some academics and NGOs thought: “The RIAA is bad. So, if
we just get good old regular American folks to decide these
questions, they’re going to see that this practice should be
permitted.”
Well they got regular American folk in
Minnesota, 102 —and what did they do? They came down hard on
her—not as hard as the statutory range permitted but very hard
indeed. They were not sympathetic to Jamie Thomas.
I think we have a disconnect from some in the blogosphere and
some NGOs, who, for various reasons, are directly or indirectly
supportive of downloading. I think the real world, unless better
99

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
Sony, 464 U.S. 417, 456 (finding the manufactutrer of home videocassette recorders
not liable for contributory infringement of the plaintiff’s copyrighted television
programs).
101
Grokster, 545 U.S. 913.
102
Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008).
100
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arguments are made, both as to statutory damages and as to
“making available,” is going to come down on the side of some
protection.
PROF. OPDERBECK: Mary, I think, has some comments she
wants to make in response.
PROF. WONG: I will keep them very brief and very quick.
It’s really to pick up on some points that my fellow panelists
have made, first on the “making available” right and secondly on
statutory damages, which I didn’t really have a chance to get to.
First of all, I don’t think Don and I are really that far apart in
terms of where this is going to go. The trend that I was describing
really is at the district court level. As Hugh says, there are very
many reasons why it is the way it is. As Don and I both
highlighted, essentially there is an open door still. None of the
cases said, “You’re definitely not going to be liable.”
I do agree with the panelists that ultimately what’s going to
happen in the U.S. is that the United States has to decide what the
scope of its distribution right is. As my presentation showed and
as Hugh said, the WCT doesn’t matter in this. We are in
compliance. Nobody cares about it. We are actually a little bit
ahead of it. So the international side of it, from the WCT angle,
doesn’t really affect this really important question, which in the
U.S. is an economics-based question: how broad is your
distribution right going to be?
I think it is interesting, although maybe not necessarily
relevant, that in the other countries, some of which I have shown to
you, the distribution right is actually somewhat restricted. This is
because the history of the distribution right in a number of
countries is a first-publication right. 103 Again, we’re going back to
the era of books and so forth. You could decide to publish a book,
meaning that the public could read your book, and once you had
the right of first publication, that was it; it was gone.

103

See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Ents., 471 U.S. 539, 552
(1985) (“The Copyright Act . . . recogniz[es] for the first time a distinct statutory right of
first publication, which had previously been an element of the common-law protections
afforded unpublished works.”).
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We have moved on in the twentieth and twenty-first century,
since then, to expand it not to first publication, but to publication,
as in Australia, 104 to distribution, as in the U.S., and to issue copies
to the public, in the U.K., 105 whatever that means.
So there is room for a broad distribution right, way beyond first
publication. I think that’s where the U.S. needs to decide—and it’s
probably going to happen at the higher-courts level—what is the
appropriate route here?
On statutory damages, I think some airing—and the discussion
we have had today, I think, is really useful—what is the role of
statutory damages in copyright law and, more generally, in U.S.
law? Going to an international context, I should say that in
countries like the U.K. and in Hong Kong, they don’t have a
statutory-damages provision. They have something called an
additional-damages or an equitable-damages provision that works
quite differently from our statutory-damages provision. 106
I just should say that there is not universal agreement as to
what statutory damages should do. Should they be a compensatory
mechanism for the plaintiff, where it is difficult to prove
infringement in the regular compensatory manner? Or should they
be punitive in nature? I think that is a discussion that we need to
have in this country.
PROF. OPDERBECK: I have a question that I want to throw
out to the panel. Let’s assume for a moment that Hugh is right
about the sort of morality of music file sharing. Just assume it for
a moment. If we do assume that, are there other activities that we
might be concerned about a broad “making available” right
capturing that we might say aren’t necessarily wrong? What do
you think those might be?
PROF. HANSEN: I think that’s a good question. If that can be
identified, then I think more thought has to go into the implications
of the “making available” right. I think that’s part of what Sherwin
was saying. I think that’s legitimate. To catch this person—if the
jury just has the reproduction right, they are going to nail Thomas.
104
105
106

Copyright Act, 1968, c. 3, § 31(1)(a)(ii) (Austl.).
Copyright, Design and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, §§ 16(1)(b), 18 (U.K.).
Id. § 97(2)(b); Copyright Ordinance, No. 15 (2007) 2 O.H.K. § 108(2).
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They don’t need “making available” to do it. We may be making
more of this than we have to, about “making available.” If you get
a reproduction right and you have all this evidence, they are pretty
much going to be doing the same thing.
So it may be that we don’t need it. But I’m just not sure. I
think if, in fact, there are legitimate situations where innocent
people are going to be caught, then it’s worth considering a
different solution. But so far at least, I haven’t seen them.
MR. SIY: Very briefly, first of all, we are dealing not just with
litigation, but also pre-litigation settlement questions. That matters
when we are talking about people who have licenses for, perhaps, a
display or a performance right who might still be open to litigation
or further negotiation pressure on a distribution right.
Again, as I mentioned, it is a strict liability crime. We don’t
want to expose people who simply have poor computer security to
a “making available” charge.
MR. VERRILLI: Can I interrupt you on that, Sherman? Tell
me one example of any case, ever, where somebody who just had
poor computer security and didn’t intend to have this material be in
a share folder was actually sued and subjected to liability. That’s
what Ms. Thomas claimed, 107 but the evidence in that case was so
overwhelming, as Hugh said, that the jury was furious at her
because she was lying like a rug about that. Where is there one
case where that has actually ever happened?
MR. SIY: If we see the theory developed further, there might
be—
MR. VERRILLI: So the answer is, there isn’t one.
MR. SIY: Why create more problems that aren’t necessary?
MR. VERRILLI: Because you are taking away the prospect of
people who have valid copyrights being able to defend a statutory
right to control distribution. And if there isn’t a problem on the
other side, why are you taking it away?

107

Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Her Three Docket 67 Motions in Limine,
Virgin Records Am., Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2.d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008) (No. 061497).
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MR. SIY: I don’t think we are taking anything away, actually.
Keeping distribution defined according to its plain language
doesn’t remove anything from the arsenal but a way to avoid
another step of evidence. I think that’s a simple procedural step
that avoids all the problems that expanding the definition reaches.
PROF. OPDERBECK: How about an example like this? Let’s
see what the panel thinks. People mentioned that I’m a musician.
Let’s say I record a song. I’m not intending to infringe, but I have
in my mind a melody of somebody else’s song, and as you listen to
my song, somebody could make an argument—I had access and
somebody could make an argument that it’s substantially similar
and could make an argument that I’m infringing. It’s available on
my computer for sharing. Should the “making available” right
cover that sort of thing?
Maybe a better example: I have a work that I believe to be in
the public domain. It turns out that my belief is wrong. It’s just
mistaken. I leave it on a shared folder in my computer. Should
that be something “making available” considers?
PROF. HANSEN: Congress has considered “innocent”
infringers. In statutory damages, a court may reduce the normal
statutory minimum of $750 minimum to $200. Even then the court
does not have to reduce the minimum. This indicates perhaps
Congress’ skepticism that anyone who is actually sued would be
unaware that their acts are infringing. Why? Because people in
that situation do not continue the practice when they are informed
it is illegal and they are not sued.
The Internet is largely a copyright-free zone. Has anyone ever
seen a notice saying, “I would like to upload this work, but I am
not able to find the author to get permission”? No. People just do
it. Most of the time these are not commercially problematic.
But downloading is a different animal. This is not collective
social innovation and creativity on YouTube. 108 This is something
which dramatically reduces the ability to market. It hurts creators
108

Examples of such innovations are “mashups,” see Wikipedia—Mashup (Digital),
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mashup_(digital) (last visited Nov. 14, 2009), and
“remixes”, see Wikipedia—Remix, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Remix (last visited Nov.
14, 2009).
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when record companies don’t have a money that lets them take
chances on new acts. It has a real impact on the small bands.
PROF. OPDERBECK: Can I push back on that a little bit?
One of the reasons some people hate the record companies is
because of this problem of a distribution bottleneck and control
over creative content. So the argument people will make is that, in
fact, loosening restrictions on copyright actually frees up people to
use stuff and remix it, use it more creatively. Actually, it kind of
broadens culture and makes more things available, rather than
allowing one entity with a lot of money and clout to be able to sort
of control what goes up, and then to decide when they want to
enforce.
I hear this theme: who is going to sue on that? But do we want
to leave that up to this one entity, to decide what gets enforced?
MR. VERRILLI: May I say something about that? I represent
these folks, and I’m today talking about my own views, not theirs.
Obviously there is something to what you’re saying, David, but
that argument seems to me to be stated at too high a level of
generality. Yes, there ought to be a vigorous debate about fair use
and how much reprocessing of the creative corpus ought to be
allowed, to ensure new creativity. There absolutely should be.
Some copyright owners whom I represent are pretty aggressive
about trying to extract revenue from that. Other copyright owners
I represent are not. They freely allow their works to be used.
But that seems to me to be different and not connected to the
“making available” argument very well. That’s sort of a question
of whether this is fair use or not. 109
With respect to this set of issues about the record companies
being a bottleneck, that was a much better argument, I think, ten
years ago than it is now. I think now the Internet is an alternative
distribution channel that is there. Actually, creators do have a
choice that they didn’t have ten years ago. They can make their
works available to the public in lots of different ways that don’t
require them to go through the traditional major record companies,
109

U.S. copyright law provides for fair use for works that are reproduced with the intent
to assist in “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research . . .
.” 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
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and a lot of them do. People can make choices. They can make
choices to allow their works out to be freely copied by anyone,
anywhere, anytime for free. Some artists do that. 110 And that’s
good. If that’s what they want to do, that’s good.
But the problem, it seems to me, with that way of thinking is
that you deprive the artists who don’t want to have that happen to
their works of the opportunity to protect their works and to
generate revenue from them, by fostering a set of legal rules that
make it virtually impossible for people who want to enforce their
rights to do so. If you are a major record company, it’s one thing.
At least you have the resources to put into the enforcement effort.
But if you are not, if you are an individual creator, you don’t have
the resources to put into this effort.
So to my mind, you are just deprived of the choice in that
situation. You are given only one choice, which is to let your work
out for free, whether that’s what you want or not. That seems very
troubling to me.
PROF. WONG: Can I jump in here and just go back to the
examples you offered, David? I think those issues are probably
issues that impact more on the right of reproduction, as well as the
right to prepare a derivative work. Of course, that brings in fairuse questions. Maybe we do need to have a discussion as to the
extent of that and, clearly, in terms of remix culture, what
transformativeness 111 means.
I don’t necessarily think that that has as much connection to the
right of distribution. Really, we are looking at it as a very
economics-based right: how much can you control at least the
initial market for your work?
I think, in conjunction with just focusing on the distribution
right, and without getting into the social value of remixed content
and transformativeness, one thing that we do need to also think
about—and this is something that the WCT negotiations really
could not get consensus on—is, with respect to distribution,

110

Ethan Smith, This Compilation CD Is Meant To Be Copied and Shared, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 20, 2004, at B1.
111
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
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economic control of markets, what do you do about the first-sale
doctrine? 112
MR. SIY: I actually want to jump in on an earlier point that
was made. I don’t think we are talking about giving a free pass to
infringers in any of these discussions, on these particular narrow
topics. I’m certainly not advocating that we eliminate statutory
damages. I will actually say that downloading an unauthorized
work that is in copyright is going to be an infringement.
I think what are involved in these cases here are the
mechanisms by which these cases are litigated. We are talking
about litigation tactics or strategies that do actually cause collateral
damage. There is potential for collateral damage on both sides. I
guess we are now used to a paradigm of war that’s more
asymmetrical. But I think litigation is a little bit more symmetrical
sometimes.
We have litigation strategies that involve sending subpoenas
based upon IP addresses, which can be easily spoofed. 113 We have
had pre-settlement negotiation letters sent to laser printers and so
on. 114
I think the driving debate behind this discussion is not what is
and isn’t infringement. I think there is an infringement there. It’s
how we go about enforcing that.
MR. VERRILLI: It’s a little tricky. Sherwin, I’m not trying to
attribute this to you. But the way the argument goes actually is a
little different. It’s, “Well, all that stuff in my share drive actually
consists of copies of my own CDs, which I’ve uploaded onto my
computer. That’s not an infringing act. That kind of copy is either
fair use or it’s not actionable.” Then the fact that it’s there and
available for other people to take it isn’t an infringing act either,
112

ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
AGE 511 (4th ed. 2007).
113
Brad Hicks, Child Porn Case Moves Forward, TIMES-TRIBUNE (Corbin, KY), Dec.
2, 2008, available at http://thetimestribune.com/local/local_story_337090905.html
(quoting an FBI agent who stated that “spoofing . . . is an attempt by one person to mask
their identity by using the location or IP address location of another person”).
114
MICHAEL PIATEK ET AL., UNIV. OF WASHINGTON, CHALLENGES AND DIRECTIONS FOR
MONITORING P2P FILE SHARING NETWORKS—OR—WHY MY PRINTER RECEIVED A DMCA
TAKEDOWN NOTICE 2, 3 (2008), http://dmca.cs.washington.edu/dmca_hotsec08.pdf.
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because there is no proof that anybody has actually taken it. So
there is no infringing act on the front end and there is no infringing
act on the back end.
That’s why I would, I think, probably differ a little bit from
both of you in the notion that the reproduction right can take care
of this effectively. It seems to me that you are just creating another
kind of cat-and-mouse game over on the reproduction side, if you
think about it that way.
MR. SIY: I don’t think it’s a cat-and-mouse game. On the
front end, if I just rip it and keep it on my hard drive and I don’t
put it in a shared folder and I don’t share it—walk through the fairuse steps. I think one of the ones that really puts it in my favor as
being a fair use is the effect on the market. 115 When I put it into a
shared file after I have ripped it, the effect on the market is very
different.
PROF. OPDERBECK: We just have a few minutes left for a
question or two, if anybody in the audience has a question they
want to ask.
MR. PAYNE: My name is Britton Payne. I’m from Foley &
Lardner, and I’m also a Fordham graduate.
You were talking about shifting the burden of enforcement,
ultimately. You look at the recent cases, like Grokster, finding that
assisting someone in an infringing act is a secondary infringement,
placing liability on a distributor. You look at Tiffany v. eBay, 116
where, although it found in eBay’s favor in trademark, it said that
the person facilitating the distribution of these goods has an
obligation that eBay met to make sure that counterfeit products
weren’t distributed. In the PRO-IP Act, 117 we see increased
penalties for aiding in the distribution of counterfeit goods. There
is sort of a movement towards shifting the enforcement of IP rights
from the owner of the IP right to the redistributor of the IP, or
people who have the ability to facilitate that infringement.
115

See MERGES ET AL., supra note 112, at 523.
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
117
Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, Pub.
L. No. 110-403, 112 Stat. 4256 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 17 U.S.C., 18
U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
116
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How do you reconcile that also with increased statutory
damages, where you might argue that those increased statutory
damages are appropriate to compensate IP owners for their efforts
in enforcing their own IP rights?
MR. VERRILLI: Let me jump in.
I’ll start with an
observation, if I may.
As somebody who brings these kinds of cases, as a lawyer for
copyright owners, when you sue the person who operates the
network that’s doing the distributing, their defense is, “It’s not my
fault. Sue the user.” When you sue the user, the argument is,
“You really can’t pin this on me. You should be going and suing
the network operator.”
You get that kind of dissonance. I think copyright owners sue
users because of the actual difficulty of establishing liability
against network operators. What the Supreme Court held in
Grokster was that when copyright owners can show that the person
operating a network or a system intended to promote copyright
infringement by virtue of operating the system, then you can
impose liability on them. 118 They didn’t hold anything more than
that.
I have to say, in a situation in which one can demonstrate, as
was demonstrated in Grokster, that the people running the system
did intend to promote copyright infringement and made their
millions of dollars almost exclusively by virtue of the promotion of
copyright infringement, why shouldn’t you be at the high range of
statutory damages? There are millions and millions of dollars to
be made there, in that circumstance.
To my mind, I don’t think we are in a world that is shifting the
enforcement responsibility onto the intermediaries. Secondary
liability, which has been around since we have had the copyright
laws and has been endorsed by the Supreme Court for more than a
118
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936 (2005)
(“[A]ctive steps . . . taken to encourage direct infringement such as advertising an
infringing use or instructing how to engage in an infringing use, show an affirmative
intent that the product be used to infringe, and a showing that infringement was
encouraged overcomes the law’s reluctance to find liability when a defendant merely
sells a commercial product suitable for some lawful use . . . .”).
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century, 119 has always been about the respective responsibilities of
the intermediaries versus the direct infringers.
There are
circumstances in which it’s appropriate to impose liability on
intermediaries. The one the Supreme Court reinforced in Grokster
is that when the intermediary is promoting the infringement and
making lots of money off of it, that seems a pretty easy case.
The harder cases are when you can’t show intent. Where is the
line when you can’t show intent? That still remains, I think, to be
worked out. Sony 120 is obviously the powerful precedent there.
But Sony cuts against the point you are making, I think. The point
of Sony is that, no, actually, there isn’t a comprehensive obligation
on the part of people who disseminate technology to bear that
burden. There are only some circumstances in which you bear
it. 121
QUESTIONER: But the difference in the actions of the people
distributing the facilitating technology—VCRs in one case,
Grokster in the other case—the difference, as I see it at least,
between Sony and Grokster, the actions that were taken—the
affirmative action whereby we see that someone intended to
facilitate illegal copying—in Sony, it was that it was offered for
sale, and in Grokster it was offered for sale, plus three winks and
nudges, as articulated by the unanimous decision in Grokster—
were really thin. It really took very little.
Now, I agree that the damage, in fact, that was being done was
pretty big. But what they actually hung the hat on was, “We can
read intent by—we are marketing to the same people, who were
bad guys. We talked about it internally, that this was something
that we could benefit from.” It just seems like it is moving towards
shifting responsibility—
MR. VERRILLI: So you are in the sue-the-individuals camp,
then, right?

119

See, e.g., Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911).
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
121
Id. at 442 (“Accordingly, the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other
articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is
widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes.”).
120
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QUESTIONER: You sue the individuals to sort of make the
point that everyone understands—
MR. VERRILLI: That’s your point, right? The intermediaries
are off the hook, so your option is to go after the individuals.
MR. SIY: I don’t think the intermediaries are off the hook.
There is a vast gulf in the culpability of a Grokster and of an eBay.
I think, despite the existence of Grokster and its take on secondary
liability, people are still pushing for filtering mandates on
intermediaries. 122 That is something that actually I’m very
concerned about.
PROF. HANSEN: It’s whose ox is gored? Actually, the
Supreme Court case was Gore. 123 Many people who are for due
process restraints on statutory damages are not for due process
restraints on jury verdicts against tobacco companies or for
personal injury cases. The irony is that critics of statutory damages
in copyright are perfectly happy with the unrestrained verdicts
against big business and insurance companies, which could
certainly be considered excessive, and on the other hand, they are
trying to limit damages in copyright which historically have been
confined to protect defendants who will never pay them in any
case.
One last thing on due process. The Supreme Court in Gore
was talking about a jury verdict unconstrained by any statutory
oversight. Congress for over 200 years has considered statutory
damages and they have always had an upper limit.
The second part of that is unlike the defendants in those cases,
who can be exposed to multiple lawsuits for the same activity.
Gore, 124 with statutory damages against a copyright defendant—
that defendant is not going to be subject to any more lawsuits and
damage verdicts. It’s a one-off deal. You don’t have this
122

Eric Bengeman, Viacom’s True Desire: One Copyright Filter to Rule Them All, ARS
TECHNICA, Oct. 22, 2007, http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2007/10/viacoms-truedesire-one-copyright-filter-to-rule-them-all.ars (“Viacom—and many other media
conglomerates—would love to see something along the lines of The One Filter emerge—
something that would instantly swat any video on any site on the Internet that Big
Content’s filters believe is infringing.”).
123
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
124
Id. at 567.
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multiplier effect. 125 So all the things that the Court is concerned
about in basic due process cases concerning jury verdicts aren’t
present with regard to statutory damages in copyright cases.
PROF. WONG: Can I just add one thing, on a somewhat
different but related note? We talk a lot about intermediaries. A
lot of that is dealt with under secondary liability, which I think is
not just in the U.S., but elsewhere. On the individual or user side,
outside of secondary liability, some jurisdictions in their civil law
provisions—not criminal liability, but civil liability provisions—
make a distinction between the basic primary rights we have talked
about—reproduction, publication, and so forth—and those kinds of
acts in relation to large-scale commercial dealings with the
copyrighted work, such that even in civil liability cases, you have
the same rights, reproduction, distribution, and so forth, but under
a different provision that is aimed directly at large-scale
commercial piracy.
We don’t have that in this country. We are dealing with a
number of issues under the same heading of liability.
PROF. OPDERBECK: Thank you very much, everyone.
MR. CAREY: Thank you, Copyright Panel, for representing
the many issues on an obviously difficult doctrine in current
copyright law. I think we can all agree that Web traffic to
Comeandgetit.com is sure to increase after today’s discussion.
For those of you that are registered, lunch will be served in the
Atrium momentarily. We invite you to stay around for the
conclusion of our symposium today at 2:30, with our trademark
panel. Thank you very much.

125
Id. at 582, 586 (holding that the $2 million in punitive damages was 500 times the
amount of actual damage and thus the ratio “transcend[ed] the constitutional limit”).

